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Abstract.	 	 A	 growing	 literature	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 leader	 image	 as	 a	
determinant	of	voting	in	contemporary	democracies,	as	a	force	now	paralleling	the	
explanatory	power	of	traditional	structural	and	ideological	factors	affecting	voting	
choice.	 Yet	 the	 actual	 effect	 of	 leaders	 in	 the	 citizen’s	 vote	 calculus	 remains	
uncertain	because	of	the	potential	reciprocal	causation	between	leader	evaluation	
and	 other	 vote	 determinants.	 	 Thus,	 the	 extent	 to	which	 voters’	 appreciation	 of	
leaders	 depends	 on	 their	 personality	 traits	 or	 on	 their	 policies,	 and	 how	 these	
forces	 variously	 influence	 the	 vote,	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess.	 To	 cope	 with	 this	
endogeneity	problem	we	 rely	on	 instrumental	variable	estimation	and	 two‐stage	
regression	analysis.		We	are	able	to	show	that	in	the	highly	polarized	2006	Italian	
legislative	elections,	 the	net	direct	effect	of	 leaders	on	voting	choice	was	actually	
weaker	than	that	exerted	by	issue	preferences.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Political	science	research	on	the	role	that	party	leaders	play	in	the	citizen’s		
calculus	 of	 voting	 has	 increased	 in	 recent	 years.	 	 Scholars	 have	 documented	
increasing	leader	visibility	and	influence	in	the	electoral	campaigns	(Swanson	and	
Mancini,	 1996),	 in	 the	 parties	 (Scarrow,	 Webb	 and	 Farrell,	 2000)	 and	 in	 the	
executive	 branch	 of	 parliamentary	 democracies	 (Karvonen,	 2010).	 	 Such	
presidentialization	 of	politics	 (Poguntke	 and	Webb,	 2005),	which	 assigns	 leaders	
centre	stage,	also	impacts	directly	on	mass	political	behavior,	with	political	leaders	
becoming	more	important	cues	(McAllister,	2007;	Aarts	et	al.,	2011;	Bittner,	2011;	
Garzia,	2011).	Moreover,	as	the	literature	on	valence	politics	argues	(Stokes,	1992;	
Clarke	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 2009;	 Bellucci,	 2006)	 leader	 likeability	 contributes	 to	 the	
popular	 evaluation	 of	 their	 party	 which,	 with	 partisanship	 and	 economic	
considerations	(Lewis‐Beck	and	Stegmaier,	2007),	strongly	orient	voter	choice.	
Yet	research	on	the	personalization	of	politics	has	not	reached	a	consensus	
on	 the	 leader	 effect,	 even	 concerning	 the	 impact	 from	 leaders’	 images	 on	 voting	
itself.		Prevailing	opinion	on	such	an	effect	in	parliamentary	democracies	has	been	
rather	 skeptical	 (King,	 2002a;	 Curtice	 and	 Holberg,	 2005;	 Karvonen,	 2010).		
Indeed,	 a	 recent	 assessment	 of	 party	 leader	 effects	 in	democratic	 elections	 finds	
that	 “party	 effects	 are	 clearly	 stronger	 than	 party	 leader	 effects”	 (Holberg	 and	
Oscarson,	2011:	39).	
	 	
Therefore,	 uncertainty	 persists	 regarding	 the	 relevance	 of	 leader	 effects,	
with	 respect	 to	 their	 absolute	 and	 relative	 impact.	 	 Here	we	 confront	 this	 issue,	
maintaining	 that	much	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 leaders	 comes	 from	 the	
way	 the	 leader	effect	 is	 conceptualized	and	measured.	 It	has	been	rightly	argued	
that	a	reciprocal	relationship	exists	between	voters’	evaluation	of	leaders	and	their	
evaluation	of	the	parties:	“People	tend	to	like	leaders	of	parties	they	like	and	since	
most	people	 tend	 to	vote	 for	parties	 they	 like,	we	have	a	problem”	(Holberg	and	
Oscarson,	2011:	37).	Hence	the	difficulty	in	assessing	leader	effects,	which	requires	
one	 to	 “disentangl[e]	 the	 impact	 of	 leaders	 from	 that	 of	 the	 parties	 they	 lead”	
(Gidengil	and	Blais,	2007:	14).	Curtice	and	Holberg	(2005:	236)	go	on	to	observe	
that	 “the	 power	 of	 the	 leaders	 lies	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 lead	 and	mould	 their	 party	
rather	than	their	ability	to	appeal	to	voters	independently	of	their	party.”	Thus,	the	
suggestion	 is	 that	 the	 electoral	 effect	 of	 leaders	 lies	 not	 only	 in	 their	 personal	
appeal,	but	as	well	in	their	capacity	to	shape	the	party’s	offer	to	voters	in	terms	of	
political	and	ideological	stances.		
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 begin	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 causality	 between	 voters’	
assessment	of	party	issues	and	party	leaders	is	reciprocal,	with	X	influencing	Y	and	
Y	influencing	X	(Miller	and	Shanks,	1996;	Macdonald	et	al.,	1998).	Such	reciprocal	
causation	 generates	 serious	 difficulties	 when	 the	 usual	 regression	 estimation	
techniques	are	applied,	namely	 the	problem	of	 simultaneous	equation	bias.	Here	
	 	
we	 cope	 with	 this	 endogeneity	 problem	 by	 using	 panel	 data	 and	 instrumental	
variables	estimation.		Through	careful	application	of	structural	equation	methods,	
in	the	context	of	real	change	over	time,	we	are	able	to	explain	the	extent	to	which	
voters’	 support	 for	 leaders	depends	on	 their	parties’	policies	and	vice‐versa,	 and	
how	these	forces	influence	the	vote.		
We	employ	data	from	the	2006	Italian	parliamentary	election,	for	it	allows	
an	 ideal	 natural	 experiment	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 leader	 effect	 on	 voting.		
After	the	1994	collapse	of	traditional	cleavage	parties,	a	new	catch‐all	party	system	
emerged.		Voters	were	largely	orphaned	from	previous	partisanships,	and	faced	a	
main	political	 contender,	 Silvio	Berlusconi,	 founder	of	 Italy’s	 largest	party,	Forza	
Italia,	and	owner	of	a	near‐monopoly	private	TV	network.	The	 launch	of	his	new	
personal	 party	 (Calise,	 2000),	 based	 on	 a	 strong,	 controversial	 usage	 of	 political	
marketing	 and	 television,	 brought	 about	 greater	 visibility	 of	 political	 leaders	
(Mazzoleni,	 1996;	 Calise,	 2005).	 	 In	 fact,	 voting	 research	 has	 uncovered	 an	
unprecedented,	strong	 leader	 image	effect,	 in	particular	 from	Berlusconi,	on	vote	
choice	(Sani,	2002).	
Our	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 a	 legislative	 election	 which	 saw	 the	 incumbent	
House	 of	 Freedom	 centre‐right	 coalition	 led	 by	 Silvio	 Berlusconi	 pitted	 against	
Prodi’	s	Union.1		The	electoral	contest	had	a	bipolar	format,	showing	a	heightened	
polarization	of	policy	positions	as	revealed	in	the	coalitions’	manifestoes.2	 	At	the	
	 	
beginning	of	the	campaign	centre‐right	trailed	in	the	polls,	showing	a	rather	stable	
5%	 lead	 for	 Prodi’s	 coalition,	 so	 raising	 expectations	 of	 centre‐left	 victory.	 To	
counteract,	Berlusconi	engaged	directly	in	a	strong	television	campaign,	exploiting	
his	 influence	 on	 the	 TV	 channels	 to	 insure	 coverage.	 The	 success	 of	 the	
personalized	 Berlusconi	 campaign	 revealed	 itself	 in	 the	 quasi‐draw	 election	
results:	Prodi’s	Union	won,	but	with	only	a	0.1%	margin	(just	24.000	votes)	over	
Berlusconi’s	House	of	Freedom.	
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	in	the	next	section	we	discuss	the	ways	
leaders	 may	 influence	 vote	 choice	 and	 briefly	 review	 previous	 research.	 Then,	
variables,	definitions	and	operational	strategies	are	presented.	Finally,	the	findings	
of	the	analysis	are	discussed	and	assessed.		As	shall	be	seen,	while	both	leaders	and	
issues	are	important,	the	latter	are	much	more	so	than	previously	thought.	
	
Leaders	and	issues	as	determinants	of	vote	choice:	A	review		
Spatial	models	 of	 party	 competition	 assume	 that	 voting	 is	 best	 explained	 by	 the	
proximity	 of	 voters	 to	 party	 policy	 positions,	 along	 a	 continuum	 of	 alternatives	
(Downs,	1957).	In	contrast,	the	existing	literature	on	the	personalization	of	politics	
assigns	crucial	importance	to	the	likeability	of	leaders	perceived	to	be	appealing	or	
competent	(McAllister,	2007;	Clarke	et	al.,	2009).	Both	these	perspectives	assume	
a	reasoning	voter,	although	the	former	relies	on	a	notion	of	rational	calculus		while	
	 	
the	 latter	rests	on	heuristic	 reasoning.	Focusing	on	 the	voters’	 cognitive	process,	
there	seems	to	be	an	inherent	reciprocal	causation	between	voters’	perception	of	
parties’	 policy	 outlook	 and	 the	 image	 of	 their	 leaders.	 Voters’	 issue	 preferences	
may	shape	the	image	of	the	party	leader,	just	as	the	likeability	of	the	leaders	may	
affect	 the	voters’	perceptions	of	parties’	policy	stances.	Miller	and	Shanks	 (1996:	
207)	 frame	 this	 cognitive	 process	 in	 terms	 of	 “persuasion”	 effects,	 according	 to	
which	voters	adjust	their	own	policy	preferences	to	match	the	position	of	the	party	
they	have	already	chosen	because	of	other	factors.	Thus,	a	party	can	be	perceived	
closer	 to	 a	voter’s	position	because	of	 the	 appeal	of	 the	party’s	 leader.	This	may	
produce,	 as	 Macdonald	 et	 al.	 (1998)	 argue,	 a	 “rationalization”	 effect	 which	
contaminates	voters’	evaluation	of	a	party’s	issue	position.	Voters	may	be	induced	
to	 locate	 a	 party	 closer	 to	 themselves	 on	 issues	 because	 they	 like	 the	 party	 for	
other	reasons.	In	this	case	“it	is	wrong	to	claim	that	issue	proximity	causes	positive	
evaluation.	 In	 fact,	 the	 reverse	 is	 true:	 proximity	 follows	 from	 prior	 affect”	
(Macdonald	 et	 al.,	 1998:	 672).	 Conversely,	 a	 party’s	 position	 on	 the	 issues	 may	
push	voters	to	evaluate	that	party’s	leader	more	favorably.		
From	 a	 different	 perspective,	 King’s	 (2002b)	 seminal	 distinction	 between	
direct	 and	 indirect	 effects	 further	 helps	 to	 illustrate	 the	 ambiguous	 covariation	
between	 these	 factors,	at	 the	same	 time	shedding	 light	on	 the	contours	of	 leader	
influence.	 Leaders	may	 influence	 voting	directly,	 via	 their	 personality,	 individual	
	 	
characteristics	and	overall	appeal	to	voters,	or	indirectly,	by	affecting	the	profile	of	
the	parties	 and	 their	 policy	 stances.	 Indirect	 influence	 is	 exerted	 “when	a	 leader	
influences	voters,	not	as	a	result	anything	he	or	she	is,	but	as	a	result	of	things	that	
he	 or	 she	 does…The	 leader	 who	 succeeds	 in	 changing	 his	 party’s	 ideology	 or	
modernizing	its	image	is	exerting	influence	in	this	indirect	sense’	(King,	2002b:	4–
5;	italics	in	original).	No	doubt	Silvio	Berlusconi	has	exerted	such	influence,	firstly	
by	 founding	and	 leading	 the	party,	but	secondly	by	shaping	 its	policy	stance	and	
ideological	 appeal	 (Campus,	 2002).	As	well,	 the	 2006	 centre‐left	 leader,	 Romano	
Prodi,	former	President	of	the	European	Commission	and	founder	of	the	Olive	Tree	
federation	in	1996,	has	influenced	the	policy	outlook	of	the	opposition	centre‐left	
coalition	(the	Union).	Approaching	the	2006	election	he	was	called	(as	in	1996)	by	
the	heterogeneous	ensemble	of	centre‐leftist	parties	to	mediate	among	centrifugal	
forces,	 on	 disparate	 issues	 such	 as	 pacifism,	 bio‐ethics	 and	 taxation.	 Prodi,	 not	
unlike	Berlusconi,	was	then	associated	in	the	people’s	mind	with	the	Union	and	its	
manifesto.	Both	 leaders,	 therefore,	 contributed	significantly	 to	 the	shaping	of	 the	
programs	of	their	electoral	coalition.	The	voters’	image	of	the	party	(coalition)	and	
their	 perception	 of	where	 it	 stands,	may	 then	be	 indirectly	 contaminated	by	 the	
likeability	of	the	respective	leader.	
Less	controversial	is	the	notion	of	the	direct	effect	of	leaders.	Politicians	can	
gain	(or	lose)	votes	due	to	the	way	in	which	their	personality	profile	is	perceived	
	 	
by	voters,	independently	of	the	image	of	the	party	they	lead.	Leaders’	image	–	based	
on	 personality	 and	 individual	 characteristics	 –	 defines	 their	 overall	 appeal	 to	
voters	 (Miller	 et	 al.,	 1986).	 Previous	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 voters	 develop	 a	
mental	image	of	political	leaders	as	persons	on	the	basis	of	a	restricted	number	of	
categories	 namely,	 competence,	 leadership,	 honesty,	 and	 empathy	 (Kinder,	 1986;	
Funk,	 1999;	McGraw,	 2003).	 The	 perceived	personality	 traits	 of	 political	 leaders	
can	also	affect	directly	voters’	choices	(Bean	and	Mughan,	1989;	Bean,	1993;	Ohr	&	
Oscarsson,	2011).		
How	can	we	disentangle	the	simultaneous	effects	of	 issue	preferences	and	
leader	likeability	on	voting?	Previous	research	on	parliamentary	democracies	has	
mainly	 assessed	 the	 impact	 of	 leaders	 on	 voting	 choice	 by	 adopting	 a	 research	
design	based	on	an	 improved‐prediction	strategy.	 	That	 is,	 the	method	of	entering	
sequentially	 variables	 according	 to	 the	 supposed	 causal	 impact	 of	 voting	
determinants,	 from	 long‐term	 to	 short‐term	 ones.	 Typically,	 entering	 the	 leader	
variable	 last	 produces	 a	 positive	 assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 leader	 image	 on	
voting	 (King,	 2002a).	 This	 however	 does	 not	 solve	 the	 inherent	 endogenity	
between	our	variables	of	interest.	Bartle	and	Crewe	(2002)	clearly	acknowledge	it,	
making	the	strong	assumption	“that,	while	party	and	leadership	images	are	caused	
by	the	same	variables,	they	do	not	in	turn	‘cause’	each	other”.	They	conclude	that	
“…the	 precise	 relationship	 between	 leadership	 and	 party	 images	 cannot	 be	 fully	
	 	
determined	 given	 the	 limited	 data	 available…Our	 bloc	 recursive	models	 assume	
that	 party	 and	 leader	 images	 are	 located	 at	 the	 same	 stage	 within	 our	 model”	
(Bartle	and	Crewe,	2002:	80‐81).	To	overcome	this	constraint,	Clarke	et	al.	(2004:	
117)	 analyzed	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 feelings	 about	 party	 leaders,	 finding	 a	
positive	relationship	with	party‐issue	proximity.	Their	testing	for	simultaneity	bias	
however	 lead	 them	 to	 conclude	 that	 feelings	 about	 party	 leaders	 are	 weakly	
exogenous	to	electoral	choice.	3			
Our	 analysis	 overcomes	 the	 limitations	 stemming	 from	 the	 possibility	 of	
simultaneity	 bias,	 building	 on	 the	 Clarke	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 notion	 of	 the	 possible	
exogeneity	 (albeit	 weak)	 of	 party	 leader	 feelings.	 	 To	 enhance	 the	 exogeneity	
argument,	we	directly	 allow	 the	possibility	of	 simultaneity,	 and	attempt	 to	more	
strongly	exogenize	leader,	as	well	as	issue,	variables.	Relying	on	the	2006	ITANES	
Electoral	 Panel	 Study,	 we	 disentangle	 the	 reciprocal	 causation	 by	 examining	
before‐and‐after	 election	 panel	 waves,	 and	 by	 exogenizing	 both	 party	 and	
leadership	 variables	 via	 instrumental	 variable	 estimation.	 Our	 research	 strategy	
unfolds	through	panel	and	causal	analysis,	with:	(a)	formulation	of	a	two‐equation	
system	of	 the	 reciprocal	effects	of	 leaders	on	 issues,	 and	 issues	on	 leaders;	 (b)	a	
two‐stage	regresssion	estimation	of	the	reciprocal	net	effects	of	leaders	and	issues	
on	 voting;	 (c)	 final	 assessments	 of	 instrumented	 leaders	 and	 issue	 variables’	
influence	on	voting	within	a	parsimonious	model	of	voting	choice.		
	 	
Data	and	measures:	A	baseline	example	
Our	individual	level	analysis	of	voter’s	choice	is	based	on	the	ITANES	Panel,	carried	
out	 in	 two	 waves.	 The	 first,	 conducted	 in	 February	 2006	 before	 the	 election,	
interviewed	 face‐to‐face	 a	 national	 representative	 sample	 of	 voters.	 Of	 the	 2005	
respondents	who	completed	the	interview,	70%	were	re‐interviewed	immediately	
after	 the	 election,	 in	 April‐May	 (n=1377).	 This	 post‐election	 survey	 serves	 a	
baseline	 for	 estimation	 of	 a	 straightforward	model	 of	 vote	 choice,	 following	 the	
common	practice	of	analyzing	a	national	election	survey	in	a	single	cross‐section.			
We	begin	with	an	assessment	of	the	direct	electoral	effect	of	leaders	and	issues	on	
vote	 choice,	 offering	 a	 parsimonious	model	 where	 vote	 is	 a	 function	 of	 leaders’	
synoptic	 evaluation	 (Leaders)	 and	 voters’	 coalition	utilities	 (Issues),	 plus	 a	 set	 of	
standard	 controls	 that	 describe	 respondents’	 placement	 in	 the	 social	 structure,		
thusly:	
	
(Eq.	1)		 Votet	 =	 Leaderst	 +	 Issuest	 +	 Age	 +	 Gender	 +	 Education	 +	 SocialClass	 +	
ChurchAttendance	+	E								
	
	It	 is	 worth	 explaining	 the	 measurement	 of	 Leaders	 and	 Issues	 in	 some	
detail,	as	they	will	serve	throughout	the	paper.		Leaders	is	a	synoptic	evaluation	of	
the	two	 leaders	based	on	the	standard	thermometer	question	probing,	on	a	1‐10	
	 	
scale,	 voters’	 likability	 of	 the	 leaders.	 Prodi’s	 score	 has	 been	 subtracted	 from	
Berlusconi’	s	 ,	and	re‐scaled	0‐1	so	that	 the	 lowest	value	of	0	means	the	greatest	
support	for	Prodi	and	the	smallest	for	Berlusconi,	and	1	means	the	opposite.4				
In	 order	 to	 measure	 Issues,	 we	 operationalize	 party	 (coalition)	
attractiveness	 according	 to	 voters’	 issue	 preferences.	 Relying	 on	 a	 Downsian	
approach,	we	have	calculated	the	voters’	coalition	utilities	by	summing	the	voter‐
coalition	 distance	 over	 three	 issues	 that	 were	 prominent	 in	 the	 campaign.		
Respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 place	 both	 coalitions	 as	 well	 as	 themselves	 on	 a	 7‐
point	scale	for	the	following:	taxation,	immigration,	worker	rights.5		The	empirical	
variable	Issues	has	been	computed	in	three	steps:	(1)	we	computed	for	each	issue	
the	distance	in	absolute	value	between	respondents’	positions	and	that	assigned	to	
the	 two	 coalitions;	 (2)	 two	 additive	 indexes	 have	 been	 then	 created:	 one	
measuring	 the	 policy	 distance	 between	 each	 respondent	 and	 the	 centre‐left	
coalition	(IssuesLeft)	and	another	measuring	the	same	individual’s	distance	to	the	
centre‐right	 coalition	 (IssuesRight).	 The	 indexes	 have	 values	 ranging	 between	 0	
(perfect	 match	 between	 respondent	 policy	 preference	 and	 a	 coalition	 policy	
position)	and	18	(total	mismatch);	(3)	finally,	each	voter’s	score	for	IssuesLeft	has	
been	subtracted	from	IssuesRight	to	compute	Issues.	The	result	has	been	re‐scaled	
onto	a	0‐1	range,	where	0	means	maximum	proximity	 to	 the	centre‐left	coalition	
and	maximum	distance	from	the	centre‐right,	and	1	means	the	opposite.	Therefore	
	 	
Issues	represents	a	synoptic	comparative	utility	for	the	voter	of	one	coalition	vìs‐à‐
vìs	the	other.	We	note	that	the	average	value	of	Issues	is	.494,	showing	the	sample	
is	evenly	balanced	on	coalition	attractiveness.	
	 Below	 follows	 a	 summary	 of	 these	measures,	 and	 the	 other	measures	 for	
this	model	 in	Eq.1	(descriptive	statistics	on	these	and	other	manuscript	variables	
are	available	in	the	Appendix).	
	
Vote	is	coded	0	for	centre‐left	and	1	for	centre‐right6;	
Leaders	 is	a	synoptic	evaluation	of	the	two	leaders,	with	a	range	from	0,	greatest	
support	for	Prodi,	to	1,	greatest	support	for	Berlusconi;	
Issues	 is	 a	 synoptic	 coalition	 utility,	 ranging	 from	 0,	 maximum	 proximity	 to	 the	
centre‐left	coalition,	to	1,	maximum	proximity	to	the	centre‐right	
Age,	is	expressed	in	years;	
Gender	is	coded	0	for	male	and	1	for	female;	
Education	has	four	categories,	from	elementary	to	university	degree;	
SocialClass	 has	 5	 categories	 (workers,	 agricultural	 and	 urban	 self‐employment,	
middle	class,	upper	middle	class)7;	
ChurchAttendance	has	five	categories,	from	‘never’	to	‘daily/weekly’	attendance;	
t	=	measured	in	the	post‐election	wave.	
E	is	the	error	term.	
	 	
In	Table	1	are	the	logistic	regression	estimates	for	this	baseline	model.	This	
preliminary	effort	performs	well:	 the	variables	Age,	Education,	ChurchAttendance,	
Leaders	 and	 Issues	 are	 statistically	 significant	 at	 some	 conventional	 level,	 and	
model	 fit	 is	 strong.	 	 Because	 Leaders	 and	 Issues	 are	 measured	 on	 the	 same	 0‐1	
scale,	we	can	compare	their	direct	effect	on	the	vote.		It	is	noteworthy	that	Leaders	
appear	twice	as	important	as	Issues	(bLeaders	=	14.31,	bIssues		=	7.22).	However,	as	we	
have	argued	earlier,	these	results	are	likely	to	be	biased	since	reciprocal	causation	
between	the	two	variables	is	at	work.	Moreover,	the	direction	of	the	causality	itself	
is	 necessarily	 in	 question,	 because	 the	 design	 is	 cross‐sectional,	 using	 post‐
electoral	measures	 to	 predict	 post‐electoral	measures.	 Our	 research	 strategy	 for	
disentangling	 this	 causality,	 which	 we	 pursue	 with	 vigor	 below,	 begins	 with	
utilization	of	the	pre‐election,	post‐election	panel	design	that	the	2006	Panel	study	
offers.	 Then,	 it	 goes	 on	 to	 sort	 out	 the	 reciprocal	 causality	 by	 employing	
instrumental	variables	estimation	within	that	pre/post‐election	panel	context.	
	
[TABLE	1	ABOUT	HERE]	
	
Reciprocal	effects	of	leaders	and	issues	in	a	panel	context	
We	have	two	goals.		First,	we	want	to	take	advantage	of	the	panel	component	of	the	
survey.	 	 Second,	we	want	 to	 sort	 out	 the	 reciprocal	 effects	 between	Leaders	 and	
	 	
Issues.	To	accomplish	the	latter	goal,	we	must	move	to	a	two‐equation	system,	one	
for	Leaders	 and	one	 for	 Issues.	 	 Let	 us	 start	with	 the	 specification	of	 the	Leaders	
equation.	 Previous	 research	 shows	 that	 leaders’	 personality	 traits	 influence	
directly	 voters’	 evaluation	 of	 leader	 likeability	 (Kinder,	 1986).	 Our	 first	
determinants	of	Leaders	will	then	be	the	two	leaders’	traits	indices.		These	indices	
are	built	from	the	respondents’	evaluation	of	the	extent	(4	categories	from	not	at	
all	–	coded	1	–	to	very	much	–	coded	4)	to	which	each	of	the	two	coalition	leaders	
possesses	eight	personal	characteristics.8	ProdiTraits	and	BerlusconiTraits	are	then	
computed	 as	 additive	 scores	 over	 the	 eight	 traits,	with	values	 ranging	 from	8	 to	
32.9		These	traits	are	held	to	be	effectively	exogenous	to	leadership,	because	they	
are	enduring	personality	characteristics	measured	prior	in	time,	and	because	they	
leave	about	half	the	variance	in	leadership	unaccounted	for	(i.e.,	respectively,	the	
R‐squared	 are	 .46	 and	 .56),	 further	 suggesting	 that	 the	 voters	 became	 better	
acquainted	with	the	leaders	during	the	campaign.		Besides	leader	traits,	we	add	a	
StrongLeader	variable,	captured	by	agree‐disagree	answers	to	the	statement	“Italy	
needs	 a	 strong	 leader”.	 This	 orientation	 relates	 to	 basic	 political	 attitudes	 –	
generalized	distrust	of	politics	and	representative	democracy	–	and	is	increasingly	
common	as	this	number	of	politically	disengaged	voters	is	on	the	rise	(Baldassarri,	
2005).	Lastly,	we	include	as	a	determinant	of	leader	likability	the	voters’	coalition	
utilities,	our	Issues	variable	measured	in	the	pre‐election	wave	of	the	survey.		
	 	
Now	 for	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 Issues	 equation	 itself,	 we	 include	 first	 the	
respondents’	 LeftRight	 self‐placement	 under	 the	 obvious	 hypothesis	 that	 voters’	
ideological	orientation	 structures	 their	party	utilities.10	 	We	 then	add	 the	voters’	
salience	of	issues,	measured	as	the	respondents’	rating	of	the	importance	of	given	
issues	on	a	1	(not	at	all	important)	to	7	(very	important)	scale.	These	variables	tap	
the	 individual	 propensity	 of	 voters	 to	 use	 issues	 as	 heuristics	 to	 make	 political	
judgments.	 Ideally	we	would	have	chosen	to	 include	the	salience	of	all	 the	 issues	
which	 comprise	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 However,	 as	 all	 measures	 were	 not	
available	 in	 the	 data	 set,	 we	 relied	 on	 the	 salience	 of	 two	 issues,	
UnemploymentSalience	 and	 CriminalitySalience.	 	 These	 salience	measures	 should	
influence	our	 issue	measure,	 if	 for	no	other	 reason	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 salience	of	
issues	 helps	 structure	 thinking	 about	 the	 issues	 themselves.	 For	 example,	 for	
voters	who	think	crime	is	salient,	they	are	more	likely	to	have	an	opinion	on	that	
issue.	 	The	 correlation	of	 these	opinions	will	not	be	 random,	with	 respect	 to	 the	
issue,	 as	would	 tend	 to	be	 the	 case	 if	 it	 held	no	 salience.	 Lastly,	we	 include	 as	 a	
determinant	of	Issues	the	pre‐election	Leaders	variable	itself.			
The	two	equations	in	the	system	to	be	estimated	can	be	written	as	follows:	
	
	(Eq.2)	 	 Leaderst	=	ProdiTraits	+	BerlusconiTraits	+	StrongLeader	+	Issues	t‐1	+	E																																										
	
	 	
(Eq.	3)	 	Issuest	 =	 LeftRight	 +	 UnemploymentSalience	 +	 CriminalitySalience	 +	
Leaders	t‐1		+	E												
	
where,	
	
ProdiTraits	 and	BerlusconiTraits	 are	 traits	 possessed	 by	 the	 leaders,	with	 values	
ranging	between	8	and	32;	
StrongLeader	has	a	range	from	1	(completely		disagree)		to	4	(completely	agree);	
LeftRight		is	voter	self‐positioning	on	the	1‐10	Left‐Right	continuum;	
UnemploymentSalience	 and	 CriminalitySalience	 are	 perception	 of	 importance	 of	
problems	on	a	scale	from	1	(nor	at	all	important)	to	7	(very	much	important);	
t	=	measured	in	the	post‐election	wave;	
t‐1	=	measured	in	the	pre‐election	wave;	
E	is	the	error	term.	
	
The	 equations	 are	 estimated	 (ordinary	 least	 squares	 –	 OLS)	 in	 Table	 2	
(Panel	 A1	 and	 Panel	 B1).	 The	 model	 fits	 appear	 satisfactory,	 with	 adjusted	 R‐
squared	of	.61	and	.48,	respectively.		These	strong	numbers	are	encouraging,	given	
that	the	independent	variables,	mirroring	to	some	extent	causality	in	real	time,	are	
measured	 four	 months	 before	 the	 dependent	 variables.	 Furthermore,	 all	 the	
	 	
independent	variables	but	one	are	highly	statistically	significant	and	rightly	signed.		
The	coefficients	of	special	concern	are	those	of	the	Issues	and	Leaders	variables	in	
the	two	equations.	They	suggest,	on	their	face,	that	the	effect	of	Issues	on	Leaders	
well	 exceeds	 the	 effect	 of	 Leaders	 on	 Issues,	 with	 bIssues	 =	 .44,	 and	 bLeaders	 =	 .30.		
However,	 we	 cannot	 uncritically	 accept	 such	 a	 conclusion	 since	 simultaneous	
equation	bias	affects	the	system,	throwing	these	OLS	estimates	into	question.			
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Exogenizing	 the	 effects	 of	 leaders	 on	 issues	 and	 vice‐versa:	 Instrumental	
variables	estimation	
This	OLS	bias	 stems	 from	 the	 correlation	 of	 the	 ordinary	 independent	 variables,	
Leaders	 (L)	 and	 Issues	 (I),	 respectively,	with	 the	 equation	error	 term	 (Wood	and	
Park,	2004).	Such	correlation	is	inevitable,	given	the	reciprocal	causal	link	between	
the	two.		The	practical	solution	to	this	problem	is	to	replace	variables	L	and	I	with	
proxies	that	will	not	be	correlated	with	the	error.		These	proxies,	or	instrumental	
variables,	 labeled	 L’	 and	 I’,	 are	 constructed	 from	 available	 exogenous	 variables.	
Note	that	only	exogenous	variables	should	be	used	for	this	purpose,	because	they	
are	 uncorrelated	 with	 the	 error	 terms,	 and	 hence	 will	 render	 the	 instrumental	
variable	likewise	uncorrelated.11			
	 	
To	build	 the	 instruments,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 the	variables	 selected	 for	 the	
task	 truly	 are	 exogenous.	 If	 that	 criterion	 is	 not	 met,	 the	 procedure	 will	 not	
overcome	 the	 bias	 problem.	 	 To	 hold	 exogenous	 status,	 these	 variables	must	 be	
caused	by	forces	outside	the	system	of	equations,	and	must	not	be	correlated	with	
the	 model	 error	 terms	 (on	 these	 points,	 consult	 the	 valuable	 discussion	 in	
Woolridge,	 2006:	 525‐540).	 	Most	measures	 of	 socioeconomic	 status	 conform	 to	
this	 standard,	 tending	 to	 be	 fixed	 characteristics	 the	 respondent	 brings	 to	 the	
voting	booth.		Also,	overarching,	basic	attitudes,	e.g.,	political	interest	or	attitudes	
toward	democracy,	can	achieve	exogenous	rank.				
With	 these	 guidelines	 in	 mind,	 we	 came	 up	 with	 a	 set	 of	 variables	 we	
believe	meet	rather	strict	exogeneity	conditions.		First,	note	that	they	are	from	the	
pre‐election	 wave,	 which	 ensures	 they	 meet	 the	 important	 causal	 criterion	 of	
occurring	prior	in	time.		Here	is	the	list	of	available	SES	variables	considered:	age,	
gender,	 education,	 social	 class,	 church	 attendance.	 	 And,	 here	 is	 the	 list	 of	 basic	
attitudes	considered:	interest	in	politics,	exposure	to	TV	news	from	state/private,	
and	 retrospective	 economic	 evaluation.	 With	 these,	 we	 construct	 instruments	 I’	
and	L’.	 	However,	we	cannot	use	 them	all	 to	 render	each	 instrument,	because	an	
insurmountable	 collinearity	 problem	 would	 ensue.	 Therefore,	 they	 were	
systematically	 separated	 into	 two	 groups,	 to	 guarantee	 their	 adequate	 statistical	
independence	and,	at	the	same	time,	maximize	their	predictive	power	as	a	proxy.12			
	 	
The	 two	 sets	 of	 exogenous	 variables,	 respectively,	 correlate	 well	 with	 the	
endogenous	Leaders	variable	(R=	.41)	and	the	endogenous	Issues	variable	(R	=	.42).	
Thus,	 we	 have	 confidence	 in	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 two	 instruments,	 whose	 inter‐
correlation	has	now	dropped	to	r	=	 .35,	down	from	the	r	=	 .68	observed	between	
the	original	variables.	Further	assurance	of	 the	quality	of	 the	 instruments	comes	
from	a	Hausman	test,	which	indicates	they	are	uncorrelated	with	their	respective	
error	terms,	a	key	assumption	for	the	proper	use	of	instrumental	variables.13	
Substituting	the	new	Leaders	variable	(L’)	and	the	new	Issues	variable	(I’)	in	
the	 right‐hand	 side	 of	 Equations	 2	 and	 3	 yields	 the	 estimates	 which	 appear	 in	
Table	2	(Panel	A2	and	Panel	B2).	Exogenizing	Issues	and	Leaders	has	not	affected	
the	structure	of	 the	models,	 as	all	 the	other	variables	 retain	 the	previous	 impact	
(as	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 columns	 1).	 What	 has	 changed,	 however,	 is	 their	 relative	
influence,	with	Issues	now	carrying	an	impact	on	Leaders	(bIssues‐hat	=	.33)	over	two	
times	greater	than	that	of	Leaders	on	Issues	(bLeaders‐hat	=	.15).	Careful	treatment	of	
the	 inherent	 endogeneity	 has	 therefore	 changed	 our	 reading	 of	 the	 reciprocal	
relationship	 between	 leader	 appeal	 and	 party/coalition	 utility:	 the	 likability	 of	
both	Berlusconi	and	Prodi	is	significantly	affected	by	the	policy	stances	that	their	
parties	take	(as	perceived	by	voters)	much	more	than	the	reverse.14	
	
	
	 	
So	what?	Leaders	and	issues	as	determinants	of	voting	
Once	 we	 have	 properly	 exogenized	 Issues	 and	 Leaders	 and	 modeled	 their	
reciprocal	causation,	we	can	finally	replace	them	in	the	initial	vote	choice	equation	
(Eq.	1),	incorporating	as	well	the	causally	stronger	pre‐post	design.			Table	3	(Panel	
A)	reports	the	logistic	regression	estimates.		The	overall	model	fit	is	acceptable	[‐2	
Log	likelihood	=	755.5;	Nagelkerke’s	R‐squared	=	.30]	and,	among	social	structural	
variables,	SocialClass	and	Age	exert	a	significant	impact	on	vote	choice.	What	about	
the	 impact	 of	 Issues	 and	 Leaders	 on	 the	 electors’	 choice?	 While	 in	 the	 initial	
estimate	(see	Table	1)	the	Leaders	impact	was	almost	twice	that	of	Issues,	here	the	
reverse	 seems	 true.	 The	 statistical	 coefficient	 of	 Issues	 (bIssues‐hat	 =	 9.8)	 is	 in	 fact	
almost	two	times	larger	than	that	of	Leaders	(bLeaders‐hat	=	5.5).			
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The	net	effect	of	these	exogenized	Leaders	and	Issues	variables	on	the	vote	
is	 graphically	 summarized	 in	Figure	1,	which	 shows	 the	predicted	probability	 of	
centre‐right	vote	according	to	the	respondent’s	coalition	utilities	and	evaluation	of	
leaders’	 likeability,	with	 all	 other	variables	 in	 the	model	 set	 at	 their	mean	value.	
The	message	conveyed	is	rather	unequivocal.	If	endogeneity	is	taken	into	account,	
	 	
then	the	effect	of	Issues	dominates	that	of	Leaders	–	this	being	especially	the	case	
for	voters	with	high	levels	of	closeness	to	the	issues.	
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Robustness	tests	
In	order	to	check	the	robustness	of	these	instrumental	variable	findings,	we	have	
carried	out	several	exercises.		First,	we	replicated	the	analysis,	attempting	to	take	
account	of	campaign	effects.	 	While	the	pre/post‐election	design	commends	itself	
in	terms	of	stronger	causal	inference,	a	possible	flaw	could	arise	from	the	fact	that	
we	 have	 not	 therefore	 taken	 into	 account	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 electoral	 campaign	
(taking	 place	 from	 February	 to	 April).	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 this	
campaign	was	intense	and	could	have	likely	affected	the	voters’	perception	of	both	
leaders’	 images	 and	 party	 policy	 positions.	 Actually,	 while	 among	 voters	 with	 a	
centre‐right	 or	 a	 centre‐left	 vote	 propensity	 before	 the	 elections	 Berlusconi	 and	
Prodi’s	 ratings	 remained	 rather	 stable	 during	 the	 campaign,	 among	 undecided	
voters	we	observe	a	clear	change.	For	those	undecided	who	then	voted	for	centre‐
left,	Prodi’s	evaluation	increased	from	5.6	to	6.7;	likewise,	for	those	undecided	who	
then	voted	centre‐right,	Berlusconi’s	evaluation	rose	from	5.4	to	6.8	(Bellucci	et	al.,	
2010).		
	 	
To	 take	 into	 account	 the	 possibility	 of	 this	 campaign	 influence,	 we	
exogenized	Leaders	 and	 Issues	 as	 before	 but	 using	 exogenous	 variables	 from	 the	
second	wave,	after	the	election	campaign.	This	allows	any	effect	from	the	campaign	
to	 be	 fully	 absorbed	 in	 the	 voters’	 calculations.	 The	 results	 of	 this	 experimental	
analysis	appear	in	Table	3	(Panel	B).		The	picture	remains	little	changed,	with	issue	
effects	still	dominating	leader	effects	(8.6/6.3).		Again,	voters	appear	driven	more	
by	parties’	policy	stances	than	by	leaders’	images.15		
	 The	second	exercise	was	to	perform	jackknife	tests,	to	examine	the	stability	
of	the	instruments.		After	all,	they	are	built	from	a	selection	of	exogenous	variables,	
and	 that	 selection	 might	 appear	 arbitrary	 to	 some.	 Thus,	 we	 excluded	 one	
exogenous	 variable	 at	 a	 time	 from	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 instrument,	 and	 re‐
estimated	Eqs.	2	and	3,	respectively,	with	these	new	instruments.		We	observe	that	
the	model	adjusted	R‐squared	barely	budges;	for	Leaders,	it	goes	from	.40‐.41,	for	
Issues	 from	 .55‐.56.	 Thus,	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 second‐stage,	 instrumented	
models	does	not	appear	to	rest	on	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	particular	variable.	
	 The	third,	and	final,	exercise	concerns	the	presence	of	media	exposure	and	
retrospective	 economics	 as	 exogenous	 variables,	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
instruments.	 	Since	one	of	 these	variables	serves	 for	 the	Leaders	 instrument,	and	
the	other	 serves	 for	 the	 Issues	 instrument,	 it	might	be	argued	 that	 this	 service	 is	
arbitrary.	 	Therefore,	 as	 a	 test,	we	 simply	 switched	 their	 roles,	 so	 instrumenting	
	 	
Leaders	with	retrospective	economics,	and	Issues	with	media	exposure		(recall	that	
both	could	not	be	included,	because	of	collinearity).	The	results	are	confirmatory.		
These	new	instruments	render	about	the	same	R	magnitudes,	in	their	correlation	
with	 the	 endogenous	 Leaders	 and	 Issues	 variables,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 old	
instruments	 (respectively:	 .42	 and	 .36).	 Moreover,	 and	 most	 importantly,	 when	
these	 new	 instruments	 are	 included	 in	 the	 vote	 model	 (a	 la	 Eq.3),	 the	 Issues	
coefficient	continues	to	be	almost	twice	that	of	the	Leaders	coefficient,	8.70/4.96.	
	 In	sum,	 from	these	 foregoing	exercises,	we	conclude	that	 the	 instrumental	
variables	results	of	Tables	2	and	3,	with	respect	to	the	impact	of	Issues	and	Leaders,	
are	robust.	
	
Conclusions	
The	 role	 of	 political	 leaders	 has	 grown	 in	 contemporary	 democracies,	 and	 their	
electoral	 appeal	 is	 assumed	 to	have	 increased.	Yet,	 voting	behavior	 research	has	
not	reached	a	consensus	on	the	actual	contours	of	such	a	leader	effect,	mainly	due	
to	 the	 difficulty	 of	 disentangling	 the	 reciprocal	 causation	 among	 independent	
variables	in	the	voting	equation.	In	this	paper	we	have	squarely	faced	the	task	of	
estimating	 the	 reciprocal	 causal	 links	 between	 parties’	 issue	 position	 and	 their	
leaders’	likeability,	and	of	assessing	how	these	influence	the	vote.	The	analysis	has	
been	carried	out	on	the	2006	Italian	parliamentary	election,	in	a	polity	which	–	due	
	 	
to	 the	 collapse	 of	 traditional	 cleavage	 parties	 and	 the	 ensuing	 strong	
personalization	of	politics	–	represents	a	favorable	case	to	test	the	hypothesis	of	an	
enhanced	 leader	 effect	 on	 voting	 choice.	 After	 careful	 treatment	 of	 the	 inherent	
endogeneity	 between	 voters’	 party	 utilities	 and	 leader	 evaluations,	 we	 find	 that	
both	 forces	 do	 exert	 an	 influence	 on	 voting.	 However,	 and	 contrary	 to	 previous	
research,	 we	 also	 find	 that	 party	 utilities	 outweigh	 leaders’	 likeability	 as	 a	
determinant	 of	 the	 vote.	 This	 result	 is	 particularly	 significant	 given	 the	 2006	
macro‐institutional	 and	 political	 context	 of	 the	 elections,	 which	 should	 have	
greatly	 favored	 the	 leader	 effect.	 Party	 competition	 had	 a	 bipolar	 format,	 a	
condition	 that	 comparative	 literature	 on	 parliamentary	 democracies	 argues	
enhances	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 leader	 on	 voting	 (Barisione,	 2009).	 Also	 the	 electoral	
system,	a	 further	condition	highlighted	by	previous	research	(ibid.)	mitigated	the	
(depressing)	 effect	 of	proportional	 representation	on	 leaders’	 assessment	by	 the	
introduction	 of	 a	 majority	 bonus.	 Finally,	 the	 closeness	 of	 the	 expected	 results	
should	likewise	have	enhanced	the	electoral	impact	of	the	leaders	(King	2002b).	
Against	 this	 backdrop,	 our	 findings	 do	not	 deny	 a	 leader	 effect	 on	 voting.	
However,	the	analysis	of	reciprocal	effects	has	shown	that	the	image	of	the	leaders	
contributes	to	the	voters’	perception	of	parties’	utilities	significantly	less	than	the	
extent	 to	 which	 issues	 proximity	 causes	 voters’	 perception	 of	 the	 leader	 image.	
Therefore,	 when	 jointly	 employed	 to	 explain	 vote	 choice,	 party	 utilities	 direct	
	 	
contribution	 exceeds	 that	 of	 the	 leaders’	 image.	 This	 is	 true	 even	 in	 a	 political	
contest	 –	 like	 Italy’s	 Second	Republic	 –	where	 the	personalization	of	politics	has	
apparently	 come	 dangerously	 close	 to	 a	 populist	 democracy.	 Our	 findings	 are	
therefore	reassuring:	our	conclusion	is	that,	in	the	voters’	eyes,	leaders	represent	
their	parties	and	their	policies		more	than	they	represent	themselves.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																								
1	 A	 new	 electoral	 law,	 enacted	 four	 months	 before	 the	 2006	 election,	 reintroduced	
proportional	 representation	 with	 a	 non‐preferential	 party	 list	 vote	 in	 multimember	
constituencies,	the	establishment	of	thresholds	for	seat	allocation	and,	crucially,	a	majority	
bonus	for	the	winning	coalition.	This	electoral	bonus,	matched	by	a	lower	threshold	(2%	
of	the	vote)	for	parties	entering	into	coalition,	represented	a	strong	incentive	for	parties	to	
join	in	electoral	federation,	declaring	in	advance	the	leader	of	the	governing	coalition	and	
its	common	programme.	Only	0.5%	of	the	votes	went	to	parties	outside	the	two	coalitions.	
	
2	In	2006,	the	distance	of	party	block	positions	(centre‐left	and	centre‐right)	on	economic	
issues	 and	 secular‐religion	 issues	 based	 on	 the	 electoral	manifestoes	 shows	 the	 highest	
level	of	polarization	since	1963	(Bellucci	and	Heath,	2012).	
	
3	 Clarke	 et	 al.	 (2004:	 116‐8),	 in	 their	 study	 of	 leadership	 effects	 in	 the	 2001	 British	
elections,	also	address	the	question	whether	 feelings	towards	 leaders	may	be	 influenced	
by	vote	preference.	 	 In	diagnosing	this	possibility,	 they	carry	out	what	they	refer	to	as	a	
“weak	 exogeneity”	 test.	 	 The	 vote	 intention	 variable,	 as	 measured	 in	 the	 pre‐election	
survey,	 is	 included	on	the	right‐hand	side	of	 the	equation	 for	declared	vote	(in	the	post‐
election	 survey).	 	 They	 find	 that,	 even	 controlling	 for	 this	 lagged	 dependent	 variable,	
leadership	effects	are	still	significant.	 	A	difficulty	with	 this	 test,	as	 they	 footnote,	 is	 that	
having	this	lagged	dependent	variable	on	the	right‐hand	side	of	the	equation	will	tend	to	
“exaggerate	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 lagged	 variable,	 and	
depress	the	magnitude	of	other	predictors”	(Clarke	et	al.,	2004:	129).	 	This	is	one	reason	
why	this	Granger‐style	test	is	considered	a	“weak”	exogeneity	test	(Greene,	2003).		Also,	as	
is	 evident	 in	 their	own	comment,	 the	 test	would	depress	 the	 impact	of	 the	 independent	
variable	 of	 party,	 so	 rendering	 impossible	 a	 balanced	 comparison	 of	 party	 vs.	 leader	
effects.	 Therefore,	 we	 decided	 to	 follow	 a	 stronger	 exogenity	 test,	 developing	 a	
simultaneous	 equation	 model	 allowing	 for	 consistent	 estimation	 of	 reciprocal	 causal	
effects	using	a	two‐stage	instrumental	variables	approach.	
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																		
	
	
4	 Prodi	 reports	 a	 somewhat	 higher	 mean	 thermometer	 score	 (4.93)	 as	 compared	 to	
Berlusconi	(4.53).	In	addition,	popular	evaluations	of	the	latter	appear	more	polarized	(st.	
dev.	=	3.1)	than	is	the	case	with	Prodi	(st.	dev.	=	2.6).	
	
5	The	format	of	the	questions	reads	as	follows:	(A)	Some	people	say	that	taxes	need	to	be	
reduced	even	through	it	might	lead	to	a	reduction	in	public	services.	Others	say	that	public	
services	 need	 to	 be	 extended	 even	 through	 it	 might	 lead	 to	 more	 taxes.	 Others	 have	
intermediate	opinions.	Where	would	you	place	your	opinion?	Where	would	you	place	the	
centre‐left	 coalition’s	 position?	 Where	 would	 you	 place	 the	 centre‐right	 coalition’s	
position?	 (B)	 Some	 people	 say	 we	 get	 too	 many	 immigrants.	 Others	 say	 that	 we	 could	
accommodate	more	immigrants.	Where	would	you	place	your	opinion?	Where	would	you	
place	 the	 centre‐left	 coalition’s	 position?	 Where	 would	 you	 place	 the	 centre‐right	
coalition’s	position?	(C)	Some	people	say	that	in	order	to	fight	unemployment	effectively	
we	should	curb	state	and	unions’	constraints	in	the	economy.	Others	say	that	instead	the	
state	should	intervene	in	the	economy.	Others	have	intermediate	opinions.	Where	would	
you	place	your	opinion?	Where	would	you	place	the	centre‐left	coalition’s?	Where	would	
you	place	the	centre‐right	coalition’s	position?	
	
6	Voters	who	did	not	vote	for	either	the	centre‐left	or	the	centre‐right	coalition	have	been	
excluded	from	the	analysis.	This	operational	choice	is	justified	by	the	negligible	proportion	
of	this	group	of	voters	within	our	sample	(i.e.,	less	than	one	per	cent;	cf.	Note	1)	and	allows	
a	much	clearer	presentation	of	results.	
	
7	The	operationalization	of	social	class	as	ordinal	rests	on	clarity	of	presentation	concerns,	
as	it	permits	us	to	show	only	one	coefficient	(instead	of	four)	in	the	following	tables.	It	is	
worth	noting	that	the	inclusion	of	social	class	as	categorical	rather	than	ordinal	leaves	the	
results	virtually	unchanged.	
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																		
	
8	 Personality	 traits	 considered	 are:	 resolute,	 responsible,	 reliable,	 skilled,	 competent,	
intelligent,	expert,	persevering.	
	
9	 Berlusconi	 appears	 especially	 strong	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘persevering’	 	 and	 ‘resolute’,	
characteristics	 that	are	widely	credited	 to	him	by	 the	whole	sample	of	 respondents	 (see	
the	 standard	 deviations)	 while	 ‘reliability’	 appears	 his	 main	 weakness	 (see	 Appendix).	
Prodi	does	not	seem	to	enjoy	any	particular	advantage	with	respect	to	Berlusconi	in	terms	
of	 personality	 traits,	 and	 his	 overall	 score	 on	 the	 additive	 index	 is	 slightly	 lower	 than	
Berlusconi’s.	
	
10	The	 inclusion	of	 respondents’	 self‐placement	on	 the	 left‐right	 scale	 (rather	 than	party	
identification)	as	summary	measure	for	their	long‐term	partisan	predispositions	is	based	
on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 left‐right	 continuum	 “seems	 to	 provide	 an	 even	 more	 important	
political	cue	for	West	European	publics	than	the	liberal‐conservative	continuum	does	for	
Americans”	 (Inglehart	 and	Klingemann,	 1976:	 243).	 Analyses	 of	 the	 Italian	 case	 further	
show	 the	 limited	 usefulness	 of	 party	 identification	 in	 the	 study	 of	 Italians’	 voting	
behaviour	(Garzia	and	Viotti,	2012).	
	
11	 Construction	 of	 the	 instruments	 goes	 forward	 in	 two	 stages.	 	 In	 the	 first‐stage	 the	
endogenous	 dependent	 variable,	 e.g.,	 I,	 is	 regressed	 (least	 squares)	 on	 the	 selected	
exogenous	variables.	The	predicted	I	variable	from	that	first	stage,	labeled	I,’	becomes	the	
instrumental	variable.	In	the	second‐stage	this	I’	is	substituted	into	the	equation,	e.g.,	Eq.	2	
for	Leaders	(L)	above,	and	then	re‐estimated	(i.e.,	two‐stage	least	squares).		The	same	sort	
of	 procedure	 would	 repeat	 itself	 for	 estimated	 Eq.	 3	 for	 Issues	 (I).	 	 The	 second	 stage	
parameter	estimates	will	now	have	 the	desirable	property	of	statistical	consistency,	and	
the	 reciprocal	 effects	 can	 be	 correctly	 interpreted.	 For	 a	 lucid	 standard	 treatment	 of	
instrumental	 variables	 estimation,	 see	Kmenta	 (1997).	 For	 something	more	 current,	 see	
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																		
Woolridge	(2006).		A	useful	example	of	the	technique,	applied	to	election	survey	research,	
appears	in	Lewis‐Beck,	Nadeau,	and	Elias	(2008).	
	
12	The	 Issues	 instrument,	 I,’	was	constructed	 from	the	 following:	 	age,	gender,	education,	
social	class,	church	attendance,	interest	in	politics,	and	retrospective	economic	evaluation.		
The	Leaders	 instrument,	L,’	was	constructed	 from	the	 following:	 	 age,	gender,	education,	
social	 class,	 interest	 in	 politics,	 exposure	 to	 TV	 news.	 Full	 estimation	 procedure	 is	
available	from	the	authors	upon	request.	
	
13	 As	 Kmenta	 (1997:	 365)	 notes,	 the	 Hausman	 test	 “can	 be	 used	 whenever	 we	 can	
implement	 an	 instrumental	 variables	 estimation	 procedure”.	 To	 illustrate,	 the	 test	
examines	whether	 the	residual,	U	(after	predicting	endogenous	 independent	variable	Y2	
from	 the	 selected	 instrumental	 variables)	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	 predictor	 of	 the	
dependent	variable,	Y1,	when	added	to	the	specification	of	the	original	equation	[e.g.,	Y1	=	
a	 +	 bY2	 +	 cU	 +	 e].	 Applying	 the	Hausman	 test	 to	 the	 equations	 of	 Table	 2,	we	 find	 the	
residual	 coefficient	 for	 the	 Leaders	 equation	 does	 not	 achieve	 conventional	 statistical	
significance	(prob.	F	=	.30).		Similarly,	the	residual	coefficient	for	the	Issues	equation	does	
not	achieve	conventional	statistical	significance	(prob.	F	=	.98).		As	well,	it	is	worth	noting	
that	the	same	test,	when	applied	to	the	vote	equation	of	Table	3,	likewise	fails	to	achieve	
conventional	statistical	significance	(prob.	F	=	.32).		Thus,	we	cannot	in	any	of	these	cases	
reject	 the	 null.	 	 We	 conclude	 that	 the	 instruments,	 as	 constructed,	 meet	 the	 necessary	
assumption	of	no	correlation	with	the	error	term.			
	
14	The	number	of	cases	included	in	the	analyses	presented	in	Panels	A2	and	B2	is	slightly	
smaller	vis‐à‐vis	 the	ordinary	OLS	estimations	due	 to	 a	number	of	missing	values	 in	 the	
exogenous	variables	employed	to	build	the	instruments.	At	any	rate,	the	exclusion	of	these	
cases	from	the	OLS	analyses	(as	in	Panels	A1	and	B1)	has	virtually	no	effect	on	the	results.	
	
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																		
15	 The	 post‐post	 specification	 of	 the	 empirical	 model	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	
significantly	higher	number	of	cases	(slightly	less	than	a	hundred)	with	respect	to	the	pre‐
post	 specification	 due	 to	 a	 lower	 number	 of	 missing	 values	 on	 the	 leader	 and	 issue	
variables	 in	 the	 post‐election	 wave.	 Re‐estimation	 of	 the	 model	 including	 only	
respondents	with	valid	values	in	both	waves	confirms	substantially	the	findings	presented	
in	Table	3,	Panel	B.	
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	Table	1.	Baseline	vote	model	(post‐election	data,	logistic	regression)	
	 B S.	E.
Age	 ‐.029* .013
Gender	 .535 .365
Education	 ‐.427+ .250
ChurchAttendance	 .364** .123
SocialClass	 .194 .138
Leaders	 14.310*** 1.398
Issues	 7.221*** 1.491
	
Constant	
	
‐.441	 1.450	
	 	
‐2	Log	Likelihood	 232.8
Nagelkerke’s	R‐squared	 .883
N	 798
	
Note:		 ***p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05;	+	p	<	.10	
	Table	2.		Reciprocal	effects	of	Leaders	and	Issues:	(pre‐post	election	data,	OLS	and	
2SLS	estimates)	
	
Panel	A:	Leaders	(dependent	variable:	post‐election;	independent	variables:	pre‐election)	
	 OLS	estimation IV	estimation
	 (A1) (A2)
	 B S.E. B S.E.
	
ProdiTraits	 ‐.018*** .001 ‐.023*** .001
BerlusconiTraits	 .018*** .002 .023*** .002
StrongLeader	 .014* .007 .021** .007
Issues	 .439*** .045 ‐ ‐
Issues’	(exogenous)	 ‐ ‐ .329*** .091
	
Constant	 ‐.101	 053	 ‐.123*	 .058	
	
Adjusted	R‐squared	 .61 .58
N	 764 749
	
Note:		 ***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05	
	
	
	
Panel	B:	Issues	(dependent	variable:	post‐election;	independent	variables:	pre‐election)	
	 OLS	estimation IV	estimation
	 (B1) (B2)
	 B S.E. B S.E.
	
LeftRight	 .022*** .003 .045*** .002
UnemploymentSalience ‐.024*** .006 ‐.036*** .007
CriminalitySalience	 .008 .006 .008 .006
Leaders	 .301*** .029 ‐ ‐
Leaders’	(exogeneous) ‐ ‐ .146** .053
	
Constant	 ‐.002	 .045	 ‐.040	 .050	
	
Adjusted	R‐squared	 .48 .41
N		 837 813
	
Note:	 	***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05	
	
	Table	 3.	 	 Final	 vote	 model	 (pre‐post,	 and	 post‐post	 election	 data,	 instrumental	
variables	estimation)		
	
Panel	A.	Vote	(post‐election)	=	f	(independent	variables,	pre‐election),	IV	estimation	
Panel	B.		Vote	(post‐election)	=	f	(independent	variables,	post‐election),	IV	estimation	
	 (Panel	A:	pre‐post) (Panel	B:	post‐post)	
	 B S.	E. B S.	E.	
Age	 ‐.013* .006 ‐.005 .006	
Gender	 .018 .185 .338* .172	
Education	 .006 .127 .059 .116	
ChurchAttendance	 ‐.038 .067 .034 .061	
SocialClass	 .232** .070 .146* .063	
Leaders’	(exogenous) 5.510*** .842 6.277*** .900	
Issues’	(exogeneous)	 9.844*** 1.247 8.649*** 1.173	
	
Constant	 ‐.065	 .704	 ‐1.019	
	
.648	
	 	
‐2	Log	Likelihood	 755.5 881.4	
Nagelkerke’s	R‐squared	 .298 .269	
N	 685 778	
	
Note:		 ***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05	
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re	1.		Predicted	probability	of	centre‐right	vote	(estimates	from	Table	3,	P
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APPENDIX.	Descriptive	statistics	of	variables	
	 N Minimum Maximum Mean	 Std.	Dev.
Vote	 771 0,0 1,0 ,4293	 ,49530
Age	 1377 18,0 94,0 48,6624	 17,33748
Gender	 1377 1,0 2,0 1,4989	 ,50018
Education	 1376 1,0 4,0 2,3164	 ,90218
ChurchAttendance	 1364 1,0 5,0 2,94	 1,454
SocialClass	 1372 1,0 5,0 3,4544	 1,44314
LeftRight	 1125 1,0 10,0 5,16	 2,742
StrongLeader	 1376 1,0 5,0 3,15	 ,990
UnemploymentSalience 1370 1,0 7,0 6,61	 ,990
CriminalitySalience	 1372 1,0 7,0 6,50	 1,015
Berlusconi	(Thermometer)	 1319 1,0 10,0 4,53	 3,090
Prodi	(Thermometer) 1281 1,0 10,0 4,93	 2,630
Leaders	 1275 0,0 1,0 ,4772	 ,28231
IssuesLeft	 892 0,0 18,0 5,4897	 4,38917
IssuesRight	 909 0,0 18,0 5,8286	 4,03689
Issues	 851 0,0 1,0 ,4938	 ,19402
	
Silvio	Berlusconi	 	 	 	 	 	
Reliable	 1281 1,0 4,0 2,24	 1,033
Competent	 1280 1,0 4,0 2,81	 ,968
Responsible	 1277 1,0 4,0 2,53	 ,979
Resolute	 1286 1,0 4,0 3,52	 ,745
Skilled	 1287 1,0 4,0 2,95	 ,987
Intelligent	 1274 1,0 4,0 3,31	 ,818
Expert	 1281 1,0 4,0 3,05	 ,899
Persevering	 1284 1,0 4,0 3,58	 ,670
*Sum	8‐items	 1189 8,0 32,0 24,1506	 5,04371
	 	
	
	 N Minimum Maximum Mean	 Std.	Dev.
	
Romano	Prodi	 	 	 	 	 	
Reliable	 1233 1,0 4,0 2,61	 ,954
Competent	 1247 1,0 4,0 2,87	 ,905
Responsible	 1226 1,0 4,0 2,83	 ,906
Resolute	 1253 1,0 4,0 2,79	 ,880
Skilled	 1231 1,0 4,0 2,69	 ,903
Intelligent	 1250 1,0 4,0 3,17	 ,803
Expert	 1260 1,0 4,0 3,00	 ,854
Persevering	 1255 1,0 4,0 2,88	 ,853
*Sum	8‐items	 1115 8,0 32,0 23,0227	 5,67613
	 	
InterestPolitics	 1373 1,0 4,0 2,12	 ,882
MediaExposure	 1336 ‐1,0 1,0 ‐,1800	 ,97259
RetroEconomics	 1355 1,0 5,0 2,01	 ,883
	
	
